I show that multiproduct …rms su¤er less than single-product …rms from the "Diamond Paradox". Equilibrium prices are high because rational consumers understand that visiting a store exposes them to a hold-up problem when they have search costs. However a store with more products attracts more consumers with low valuations, and therefore charges lower prices. Advertising a few products at low prices enables the …rm to credibly commit to low prices across the rest of the store. "Loss-leading" can therefore be optimal. If demands are subject to random shocks, prices are shown to move counter cyclically.
Introduction
Typically retailers only advertise the prices of a few of their products (and many others do no advertising at all). Consequently consumers usually learn the price of a particular product only once they have arrived at the retailer. Despite all of the marketing and online price comparisons available to supermarket shoppers, even in that sector most price information is probably still gathered instore. 1 However shopping (especially for basics) can be timeconsuming, so visiting stores and learning about prices is not the easy and costless activity which many papers assume it to be. I therefore present a simple model which captures this important feature. Consumers must pay a (small) shopping cost in order to travel to a multiproduct monopolist and discover its prices.
The …rst contribution of the paper is to show that multiproduct …rms can resolve the Diamond Paradox [8] . The exact details of this Paradox depend upon whether a consumer has unit or downward-sloping demand. Most of the literature (implicitly or explicitly) assumes unit demand, and so does this paper. Suppose …rms sell a single product, and consumers must pay a cost s > 0 to learn any retailer's price. If consumers expect each retailer to charge p E , they only visit a …rm if they value the product more than p E + s. So once somebody has turned up to a store, they will buy the product there provided its actual price is less than p E + s (the consumer still gets positive surplus, and it is not worthwhile to pay another s and visit another retailer). Therefore …rms always charge more than consumers expected. The only equilibrium outcome of the model is for consumers to expect very high prices, nobody to visit any retailer, and no trade to occur.
Unsurprisingly, many papers have suggested possible ways to overcome this 'no trade' result. Possible resolutions include advertising (Wernerfelt [24] ), product di¤erentiation and unknown match values (Anderson and Renault [1] , Konishi and Sandfort [13] ), as well as repeated interaction between consumers and producers (Bagwell and Ramey [4] ). In Stahl [21] , some consumers are 'shoppers' -meaning they have zero search costs and learn 1 Simester [20] suggested that (in 1995) a typical supermarket stocked 25; 000 products and advertised 200 of them. Large UK supermarkets stock 30; 000 di¤erent products ('The rise and rise of Lidl Britain', The Daily Telegraph, September 10 th 2008). Tesco.com allows a comparison of some 10; 000 prices with its main rivals, but may be slightly out of date; searching the website is time-consuming; smaller outlets are excluded; and relatively few people may use such sites often. every price in the market. The remaining consumers pay s > 0 for each price quotation that they learn. Firms cut prices to win business from the shoppers, and hence trade occurs. 2 In this paper I interpret the Diamond Paradox as occurring because of a 'sample selection problem'. Only consumers with relatively high valuations …nd it worthwhile to go shopping. Therefore retailers always want to charge high prices, which ultimately causes the market to collapse. Multiproduct retailers can overcome the paradox, because they attract a broader selection of consumers. Somebody with a low valuation on one product may visit a store because they have a high valuation on something else. Consequently consumers within the store are more representative of the population. This restrains the …rm's incentives to surprise consumers with high prices, and makes equilibria with trade possible. Although every consumer has the same strictly positive search cost, some consumers behave as if they are shoppers in the sense of Stahl.
The model also provides several insights into …rm behaviour. It predicts that a store with a broader product selection should charge lower prices but earn more pro…t on each good. A simple rationale is also provided for why low advertised prices on a few products can credibly signal low prices on the rest of the store's (unadvertised) products. Prices are also predicted to be countercyclical.
In a recent survey, 86% of American consumers said they thought larger stores (with broader product selections) charge lower prices. 3 Consistent with this, Hoch et al [10] …nd that larger grocery stores have more elastic demand curves. There is also abundant anecdotal evidence that bigger retailers tend to charge less. For example although the major UK supermarkets use national pricing, this does not apply to their smaller stores, which are typically more expensive. 4 The main explanations for this are costs and convenience. Larger stores may enjoy economies of scale and buyer 2 Burdett and Judd [6] present a similar idea. All consumers are ex ante identical, but the number of prices learnt upon paying s is stochastic and sometimes exceeds 1. Hence some consumers have better information, which encourages …rms to cut price. 3 power, which they pass on in lower prices. Smaller (convenience) stores may also attract time-poor but cash-rich consumers. The model in this paper presents a di¤erent interpretation. A retailer always prices to a select sample of relatively high-valuation consumers. However a store with more products attracts more consumers, and these consumers have on average lower valuations. Hence a larger retailer …nds it optimal to charge lower prices. The recent drive towards one-stop shopping 5 can then be interpreted as an attempt by …rms to commit to low prices across their whole product range.
Most retailers either do no price advertising, or they advertise a small number of products at very low prices. Occasionally products are even sold below cost, with examples ranging from books 6 to realtime share prices 7 . Supermarkets are also well-known for using loss-leaders to boost store tra¢ c. 8 This raises an interesting question: what e¤ect does price advertising have on overall price levels? There are two main viewpoints. On the one hand, retailers may increase the prices of unadvertised products, to make up lost margin on items that are sold cheaply. On the other hand, advertising a few products may enable e¢ cient retailers to signal their low costs (and general low price level). 9 The papers by Lal and Matutes [14] and Simester [20] capture these ideas.
In Lal and Matutes [14] consumers have unit demands and identical willingnesses to pay. One product is unadvertised and consumers pay their reservation price for it. Another product is advertised, and used solely to compete for store tra¢ c. In Simester [20] …rms also stock two products, and advertise the price of only one. Consumers have identical and downwardsloping demand for the unadvertised good. A …rm's production cost is correlated across products, and more e¢ cient …rms charge less for their unadvertised product. They may signal this by advertising a low price on the other product. The crucial assumption in my paper is that consumers have heterogeneous willingnesses to pay. This implies that a retailer receives only a select sample of consumers who have relatively high product valuations. When a product is advertised at a low price, this draws new consumers into the store. These new visitors must have relatively low valuations for other products (otherwise they would have visited even without the advertising). The retailer optimally cuts prices on unadvertised product lines in an attempt to win more business from the new consumers. Hence the model provides an intuitive explanation for how low advertised prices on a few products can successfully signal a low store-wide price image. Loss-leadership pricing is also shown to sometimes be optimal. 10 It is well-known that retailers tend to mark down items during periods of high general demand -such as weekends and holidays. Further, when individual items are in high demand, they are often advertised at low prices.
(See Warner and Barsky [23] and MacDonald [15] ) One possible explanation for countercyclical pricing is Rotemberg and Saloner's [19] model of collusion. Alternatively, Warner and Barsky argue that during weekends, consumers visit more shops and so become more responsive to prices. Bils [5] argues that new customers may have less brand attachment. When lots of new consumers enter the market, it is optimal to cut price and persuade them to try the product. In my model, weekends mean that more consumers are interested in buying a product. New consumers visit the store, and they tend to have low valuations on other products. Hence the retailer again has more incentives to charge lower prices across the whole of its product range.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 sets out the main assumptions. In Section 3 I solve the model and demonstrate how a multiproduct retailer can overcome the Diamond Paradox. Comparative statics results are provided in Section 4, whilst Sections 5 and 6 discuss the results and provide possible extensions. 10 Empirical evidence is ambiguous. Milyo and Waldfogel [18] study the lifting of a ban on alcohol price advertising. They …nd little e¤ect on overall alcohol prices, and no e¤ect on the prices of unadvertised alcohol products. However their sample is small, and they cite other (cross-sectional) papers which do …nd that advertising results in lower prices. Collins et al [7] present some evidence that banning loss-leaders results in high prices.
Assumptions
There is a single …rm that produces n goods, indexed by j = 1; 2; :::; n, at zero marginal cost. The products are neither substitutes nor complements, and consumers demand at most one unit of each. Consumer valuations for the n goods are denoted (v 1 ; v 2 ; :::; v n ). For each consumer, v l and v k are independent whenever l 6 = k. Each v j is drawn from [a j ; b j ] (where b j > 0) using a distribution function F j (v j ) (with corresponding density f j (v j )). f j (v j ) is strictly positive, continuously di¤erentiable, and logconcave. This ensures that the hazard rate
Characterising Equilibrium Prices
Equilibrium in this model has three requirements. First, consumers only visit the store if they expect to earn enough surplus to cover the shopping cost (given their valuations and expected prices). Second, actual prices must maximise …rm pro…t (given expected prices and therefore given the types of consumers who visit the store). Third, expected prices must equal actual prices (rational expectations).
Write the demand for an unadvertised good (call it good 1) as:
A consumer buys good 1 if (a) he values it more than its actual price, and (b) he turns up to the store. Turning up is only worthwhile if total expected surplus P n j=1 max v j p E j ; 0 exceeds the shopping cost s. Through this turn-up decision, demand for any one product depends upon the expected prices of all goods. Nevertheless conditional upon visiting the store, demand for a product depends only upon its actual price. This is because goods are neither substitutes nor complements.
consumers, and thus make trade possible:
Proposition 1 When n is su¢ ciently large, there exist equilibria in which the …rm optimises, consumer expectations are ful…lled, and trade occurs When n = 1 trade breaks down because no marginal consumer ever visits the store. By contrast when n is su¢ ciently large, many consumers visit the store, and many of these have marginal valuations for each product. Demand curves become su¢ ciently sensitive to small price changes, so the …rm is deterred from surprising consumers with price increases. Of course if there is no advertising, no-trade Diamond equilibria exist as well. (If consumers expect very high prices, nobody visits the store, so the …rm is indi¤erent between all prices and is happy to charge whatever consumers expected) However the Diamond outcome is not a very compelling prediction of possible play. For example, suppose the monopolist must incur an entry cost. The …rm would never enter if it expected a zero-pro…t Diamond outcome; by entering the market, the …rm signals to consumers that it expects to play a non-Diamond equilibrium. Discussion of equilibrium multiplicity and (where required) selection is left till the next section.
Before concluding this section, rewrite the pricing condition (2) as
; 0 is expected surplus on good j. Pricing is a¤ected by the behaviour of three di¤erent groups. Consumers with P n j=1 t j < s do not expect to cover the shopping cost, and therefore do not visit the store. They do not observe the actual price p 1 and so their demand for good 1 remains at zero. Consumers with P n j=1 t j s do visit the store, and subdivide into two groups:
Shoppers for product 1 have P n j=2 t j s
Diamond consumers for product 1 have P n j=1 t j s > P n j=2 t j
Shoppers for product 1 turn up at the store regardless of their valuation for the product. Consequently they reveal no information about their v 1 , which continues to be distributed on [a 1 ; b 1 ] with the usual density f 1 (v 1 ). The pro…t earned on these consumers is simply p 1 [1 F 1 (p 1 )] (the same as in a standard zero-search-cost monopoly problem), so small changes in p 1 around p
The term 'shoppers for product 1'is used to describe these consumers because they act as if they have no shopping cost when it comes to buying good 1. In contrast, Diamond consumers for product 1 have v 1 p E 1 > 0. They would all continue to buy product 1 even if the …rm increased p 1 slightly above p 
Corollary 3
The …rm prefers equilibria with lower unadvertised prices Interestingly, both consumers and the …rm itself bene…t from a small reduction in unadvertised prices. Intuitively, a decrease in p E 1 bene…ts the …rm in two ways. Firstly, it lowers the price of product 1 closer to p m 1 and therefore makes the product more pro…table. Secondly, the price decrease draws more consumers into the store, expanding demand and therefore pro…ts on other products in the store.
Comparative Statics
I …rst solve the model for small shopping costs. I then show that the results generalise to arbitrary s, provided two natural conditions are imposed.
Comparative static results are best understood using sample selection and shoppers/Diamond consumers. A shopper for product 1 has P n j=2 t j s whilst a Diamond consumer for the same product has P n j=1 t j s > P n j=2 t j . Figure 2 illustrates this in v 1 ; P n j=2 t j space. The distribution of P n j=2 t j s. So if P n j=2 t j increases, more consumers visit the store and become shoppers for product 1. Region III : consumers with v 1 p E 1 + s de…nitely visit the store, and are shoppers or Diamond consumers for product 1 depending upon whether P n j=2 t j exceeds s. Clearly then, as P n j=2 t j increases, the number of shoppers increases and the number of Diamond consumers falls. Region II deals with v 1 2 p E 1 ; p E 1 + s . An increase in P n j=2 t j converts some Diamond consumers to shoppers. It also attracts new people to the store, some of whom become shoppers and others who become Diamond consumers. Therefore in Regions I and III, an increase in P n j=2 t j raises the ratio of shoppers to Diamond consumers, whilst Region II is ambiguous. I now propose two methods to overcome this ambiguity.
Small Shopping Costs
I begin by focusing on the special case s ! 0 + (the shopping cost is strictly positive but arbitrarily small). The mass of consumers with v 1 2 p Figure 2 -becomes vanishingly small. Referring to the above discussion, it is clear that a shift up in the distribution of P n j=2 t j will increase the probability of being a shopper and decrease the probability of Complementarity ensures existence of a Pareto Dominant equilibrium. Hold constant any advertised prices and look for equilibrium vectors of unadvertised prices. Since the equilibrium price of product j is an increasing function of the expected prices of all other goods, Tarski's Fixed Point Theorem guarantees the existence of a lowest price vector. By Corollary 3, this is also be the Pareto Dominant equilibrium.
Assumption: Agents play the Pareto Dominant equilibrium
This assumption is probably less severe than it might …rst appear. There always exists a region of …xed entry costs such that the …rm only enters if it expects to play the Pareto Dominant equilibrium. Hence by Forwards Induction Logic, entering coordinates expectations on the low-price equilibrium. Often there is one low-price equilibrium and several high-price (low-pro…t) equilibria, so the region of entry costs for which this works can be quite large. Burning money to arti…cially increase …xed costs, as well as cheap-talk in advertisements, can also help focus beliefs.
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Proposition 5 A store with more products charges lower prices Precisely, if advertised prices are held constant and n is increased, unadvertised products become cheaper. 19 When a new product is introduced, some additional consumers are attracted to the store, and they act as shoppers for each existing product. Also some consumers who were previously turning up but were reliant on a particular product, are not any longer. Hence each existing product receives more shoppers and less Diamond consumers. The …rm wants to lower its unadvertised prices and expand output sold to these shoppers. So consumer expectations adjust downwards and 18 In equilibrium there would be no need to actually burn the money. Forwards Induction can work in other ways too. For example, stocking n goods may give a unique equilibrium, but n 0 goods give both a low and a high equilibrium. Choosing n goods may be best if with n 0 the high equilibrium is played, but choosing n 0 goods may be best if the low equilibrium is played. By choosing n 0 goods the …rm signals it expects the low equilibrium. 19 Some restrictions are needed to ensure that pro…t is quasiconcave in the price of the new product. It is su¢ cient that valuations for the new product have a similar distribution to an existing product, and/or the conditions given earlier hold. equilibrium prices are lower. 20 As n grows large, the price of each product gets close to its standard monopoly level and the …rm can almost extract all monopoly rents. See also Armstrong [2] .
When prices are unadvertised and distributions are identical, non-Diamond equilibria exist if and only if n exceeds a thresholdñ. In the case of U
, the probability they turn up is 1 1. There is almost no sample selection problem, so the …rm prices almost as if there were no shopping cost. However as a is reduced, the tail of the distribution is pulled down and there are more low-valuation consumers for each product. Given any expected price, fewer people visit the store and the …rm faces a more adverse selection. Therefore as a is reduced, equilibrium price increase. I now reintroduce advertising and consider its impact on equilibrium.
Proposition 6
If the monopolist reduces an advertised price, the prices of unadvertised products fall as well Lower advertised prices -just like increased product variety -attract a broader mix of consumers to the store. The …rm therefore faces a weaker sample selection problem, and responds by charging less on each unadvertised product. The implicit assumption behind the Proposition is that a …rm must (for legal or other reasons) not renege on any price that it has committed to via advertising. Conditional upon that assumption, an advertised price on one product is informative about the prices of everything else. In particular, the model gives a theoretical justi…cation behind the idea that low advertised prices on some (it need not be many) products can be very 20 There is an an analogy with Keynesian multipliers. Suppose initial price expectations are q 0 . Given expectations q 0 , with the new product the …rm wants to charge q 1 < q 0 . If consumers then expect q 1 , shoppers become yet more numerous and the …rm wants to charge prices q 2 < q 1 instead. Consumers can then expect prices q 2 and so forth. The decreasing sequence fq t g 1 t=0 converges to the rational expectations equilibrium. The initial increase in n gets successively multiplied up into lower and lower prices. The e¤ect of product range on price e¤ective at building a 'low-price' image on the rest of the store's product portfolio. I now consider the e¤ect of product-speci…c demand shocks. A simple way to model these is to place the following structure on consumer valuations:
with probability j An increase in j means that product j is more popular, and ceteris paribus is demanded more often by consumers. Within a convenience store, for example, certain products like milk will have a higher than other products such as shampoo. When any advertised prices are held constant, the following result obtains:
Proposition 7 A positive demand shock on one product reduces all unadvertised prices. Within the store, more popular unadvertised products have higher prices
Consider the …rst part of the Proposition. Higher demand for any one product brings extra people into the store, especially those with low valuations. Hence the …rm faces a less adverse selection, and charges lower prices across the store. Prices are therefore countercyclical. Now consider the A very popular product attracts many consumers to the store and therefore provides less-popular products with many shoppers. However these less-popular products are not an important factor in consumers'decision to visit the store, and therefore do not provide many shoppers for the popular products. This gives the …rm a greater incentive to surprise consumers with price cuts on unpopular products (to attract the relatively large number of shoppers) and price rises on popular products (to attract the relatively large number of Diamond consumers). Figure 4 illustrates graphically the e¤ect of demand shocks. In the example there are three unadvertised products, F (v) = 2v 1, and 2 = 3 = 2 3
. When 1 increases above 2 3 , product 1 becomes the most important factor a¤ecting whether consumers visit the store, and hence it becomes relatively more expensive. But the prices of all goods are strictly decreasing in 1 .
To summarise, increased product variety, low-price adverts, and positive demand shocks, all attract a broader mix of consumers to the store. This eases the …rm's sample selection problem and reduces unadvertised prices. Although store tra¢ c increases in each case, it is the broader mix of consumers that is crucial. For example suppose with probability 1 a consumer has v j = 18j, and with probability > 0 product valuations are iid on interval [a; b]. Increases in raise store tra¢ c, but the mix is unchanged -new visitors have the same joint distribution over valuations as old visitors. Consequently the …rm's pricing incentives are unchanged, and there is no e¤ect on equilibrium prices.
General Shopping Costs
It is intuitive that the comparative statics results in the previous section continue to hold whenever s is 'su¢ ciently small'. 21 These results also hold for a general s in simple environments where the …rm only stocks two products. They also extend to arbitrary numbers of products provided that two natural conditions are imposed on the distribution of consumer surplus.
Proposition 8 Consider an arbitrary s

Product range Assume identical distributions and no advertising
Equilibrium price falls when n is increased from 2 to 3 Advertising Assume n = 2 and one product is advertised
The equilibrium unadvertised price increases in the advertised price Demand shocks When n = 2, Proposition 7 holds I now show how the comparative statics results can be extended beyond the two-product environment considered in Proposition 8. Let T m;p be the total expected surplus from m products when facing expected price vector p = p T m;p is always increasing in m and decreasing in p in the sense of …rst order stochastic dominance (FOSD). Conditions C1 and C2 are stronger, and require that conditional distributions satisfy FOSD as well. Hazard rate dominance is a common assumption in problems with multidimensional types.
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C1 ensures that pricing problems are complementary. To illustrate this, suppose that the vector p E 2 ; p E 3 ; :::; p E n increases. Product 1 becomes more expensive if and only if its ratio of Diamond consumers to shoppers increases (since the …rm then has more incentives to surprise consumers with a high price). A su¢ cient condition for this is that region II in Figure 2 is wellbehaved. Take a typical locus of points in this region w x y z. We require that the probability of being on x y relative to the probability of being on y z, is increasing in the price vector p E 2 ; p E 3 ; :::; p E n . This is the same as requiring that Pr P n j=2 t j z = Pr P n j=2 t j s is increasing in price, or that C1 holds. This ensures that a Pareto Dominant equilibrium exists, and that unadvertised prices are positively associated with all other prices.
C2 governs comparative statics in product range, search cost, and demand shocks. Assume either C1 is satis…ed or that distributions are identical (in which case a Pareto Dominant equilibrium exists). C2 says that conditional on visiting the store (having P n j=1 t j s), a consumer is less likely to be a shopper for a product (have P j6 =k t j s) when s is larger. Equivalently when the search cost increases, Diamond consumers become more numerous relative to shoppers. It follows immediately that when s increases, the …rm has incentives to charge more on each product than was previously expectedand hence equilibrium unadvertised prices increase. Stocking an additional product has the opposite e¤ect. Some consumers expect to get positive surplus from the new product, and this e¤ectively decreases their shopping cost. As a result shoppers become relatively more numerous, the …rm has incentives to reduce prices, so in equilibrium unadvertised products become cheaper. A positive demand shock has the same e¤ect: when j increases, extra surplus is randomly allocated across consumers so their e¤ective search cost falls and the …rm wants to charge less on each product.
Continuity of Equilibrium around s = 0
Equilibrium prices need not be discontinuous around s = 0, but usually are. If the …rm stocks a single product and s increases from 0 to something slightly positive, the equilibrium price jumps up from p m to b. This discontinuity does not happen in a multiproduct context if there exists some good l which is advertised at a price p l < a l . This is because every consumer visits the store to buy l and is a shopper for all unadvertised products -which are consequently priced at their respective standard monopoly levels. Ruling this out, a necessary condition for avoiding discontinuity is that there exists an unadvertised product j with p m j = a j . A su¢ cient condition is that there exists a second unadvertised product k that also has p m k = a k . The reasoning is best illustrated through an example. Suppose n = 2,
so this is an equilibrium. Intuitively even marginal consumers are very valuable to the …rm since the distribution is shifted up a lot relative to marginal cost. This explains why the …rm strictly prefers to sell to everybody when s = 0. Even when s ! 0 + , provided there are su¢ ciently many valuable marginal consumers in the store, the …rm still wishes to sell to them all.
Discussion
"large volume operations create an impression of lower prices... lots of advertising, and a wide assortment... are the accepted cues for lower prices; a small store is considered the strongest indicator of high prices... [loss leaders are] associated with high volume operations." (Brown 1969) This quotation from a consumer survey captures the essence of the model very well. It is often argued that retailers with high volumes enjoy lower costs, which they pass on in lower prices. This paper suggests another channel -sample selection. A retailer always receives relatively high-valuation consumers from the population. This selection problem is less severe whenever the store sells a broader product range, has high-demand goods, and uses low-price advertising. The model also has many interesting implications.
Informative advertising
Large retailers often advertise (very) low prices on a selection of their products. Simester [20] argues that low-price advertising can signal a low marginal cost, and hence signal low prices across the whole store. Lal and Matutes [14] argue instead that unadvertised prices are high and unrelated to advertised prices.
My model gives a di¤erent perspective -advertising is informative. I demonstrate that low-price advertising on a few products, can act as a credible signal of store-wide low prices. This happens even when products are independent in both use and valuation. A retailer should clearly never advertise a product at a price above its standard monopoly level. Hence there is a natural dispersion between cheap advertised products and expensive unadvertised items. Nevertheless consumers are sophisticated. They use advertisements to make inferences about other prices, whilst recognising that advertised prices are typically much lower. Selling certain products below cost can also be a pro…table strategy, though examples usually require large s and/or discrete value distributions and only one product is advertised, it is sold at a loss According to the model, products should be advertised at low prices when their demand is exogenously high. We saw in Proposition 7 that the most popular products are also the most expensive when they are unadvertised. Advertising them therefore has two bene…ts. Firstly, their price can be reduced and their pro…tability greatly increased. Secondly, because they are so popular, advertising them cheaply helps bring lots of new consumers to the store, which helps commit to signi…cantly lower prices on the rest of the product range. There is lots of empirical evidence that products tend to fall in price when their demand is high (MacDonald [15] , Warner and Barsky [23] ). This might seem puzzling, but the model provides an intuitive rationale for this behaviour. The model also says that prices in general should be lower when aggregate demand is higher. Empirical evidence suggests this is also true -retailers seem to mark down items at weekends and during holiday seasons (Warner and Barsky [23] ).
Kaul and Wittink [12] report that advertised products usually have more elastic demand curves.
The model presented in this paper provides a simple explanation. If product 1 is unadvertised, its demand is equal to
If instead it is advertised, its demand equals
Demand for good 1 is more responsive to changes in p 1 when the price is advertised. The reason is that turnup decisions now depend upon p 1 rather than on just a …xed expectation p E 1 .
Product Line Spillovers
The model also suggests a di¤erent way of thinking about product range.
Convenience retailers (as well as specialist/niche suppliers) are interpreted as being 'trapped' into charging unpro…tably high prices. These retailers attract a small subset of consumers who tend to be interested in only a few items and therefore have very inelastic demand curves. Expecting very high prices, only consumers with especially high valuations turn up to the store. By contrast, stores with a broader product range and/or higherdemand items charge lower prices but earn proportionately higher pro…ts (so doubling each j more than doubles pro…ts). This works solely through demand elasticity and has nothing directly to do with demand, although the resulting price decreases do of course expand demand.
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Consequently introducing a new product brings both a direct bene…t (its own pro…t) and an indirect one (higher pro…t on other items). Nevertheless (assuming introducing a new product has some …xed cost) it is unclear whether optimal product range increases or decreases when moving from s = 0 to s ! 0 + . On the one hand a new product brings indirect bene…ts and is therefore more valuable. But on the other hand prices are high and pro…t on the new product is therefore low, so it is less valuable. Either e¤ect may dominate, depending upon the precise example. Nevertheless the model may partly explain the recent drive towards one-stop shopping. When valuations are a¢ liated and s is small, the comparative statics results in Section 4.1 continue to hold. Letting s ! 0 + , we can rewrite (4)
Therefore …xing p E 2 ; p E 3 ; :::; p E n there is a unique equilibrium p E 1 that is increasing in other expected prices. Adding new products (and/or advertising old ones at lower prices) brings in more consumers who are marginal for product 1. This again makes demand for product 1 more elastic and pushes down its equilibrium price.
It is interesting to consider whether the monopolist should choose a niche or an eclectic product range. Niche products are rated similarly (you either love or hate everything), but eclectic products can be valued very di¤erently. To be concrete, suppose eclectic products have valuations independently and uniformly distributed on [a; b]. Further, consumer i's valuation for the niche product j is v ij = x i + y j . x i is a consumer-speci…c taste parameter that is U [a; b]; y j is product-speci…c and is U [ ; ] where is small but at least an order of magnitude larger than s. 24 I assume b 2 > a and look for symmetric equilibria.
Imagine the …rm must choose between stocking n niche products or n eclectic products -which should it choose? If p ni and p ec denote equilibrium prices under the two arrangements, then it is simple to demonstrate that
(Note that as n ! 1, price tends towards the standard monopoly price in both cases 25 ) Sometimes an eclectic mix always delivers a lower price (and higher pro…t) regardless of n. Otherwise (and this is usually the case) the optimal choice is to pick a niche product range when n is small, and an eclectic mix when n is large. This is illustrated in Figure 5 when valuations are uniformly distributed on [0; 1]. The crucial factor is always how many marginal consumers visit the store. When n is small and products are eclectic, few marginal consumers turn up -valuations for other products are dispersed and prices relatively high. But if products are niche, the marginal consumer for product 1 has a high x and therefore high valuations for other products -making it quite likely he will visit the store. Consequently when n is small, a niche selection delivers more marginal consumers and therefore lower price. As shown in the …gure, this reverses when n is su¢ ciently large. Intuitively some consumers who are marginal for product 1 had quite a low x i but a high y 1 draw. To persuade them to visit the store requires a large y j draw on some other product j -and to achieve this requires many extra products to be added. On the other hand, with an eclectic selection, each new product is totally di¤erent and valuations are completely random -therefore it is much easier to attract new marginal consumers.
Substitutes
Imagine a situation in which the retailer sells several products but they are all substitutes -meaning that a consumer wants to buy at most one of them. It is simple to argue that without advertising, only a no-trade Diamond equilibrium exists.
An advertised price on one product acts as a signal about the prices of other substitute products. To illustrate, suppose there are two goods with 
Shoppers
Up to now I have assumed that everybody has the same strictly positive shopping cost. I also showed that the monopolist's problem could be rewritten in such a way that some consumers acted as if they were shoppers and had zero shopping cost (in the sense of Stahl [21] ). I now brie ‡y consider what happens if some consumers have an exogenously given zero search cost.
Suppose that a fraction of consumers have s 0, whilst the remaining 1 have s ! 0 + . Then the analogue of (4) is
Intuitively a consumer is only not marginal if she is not a shopper in the exogenous sense (happens with probability 1 ) and also not a shopper endogenously (which happens with probability Q n j=2 F j p E j ). It is then apparent that the usual comparative statics continue to hold. In addition, if the proportion of shoppers increases, more of the population visits the store and the …rm can infer less about valuations, and hence charges lower prices. These results generalise provided that the non-shoppers's is not too large.
Competition
Fuller investigation of the e¤ects of competition is deferred to another paper. In this short section I brie ‡y demonstrate that in the absence of advertising, competition does not in ‡uence pricing decisions.
Suppose there are several retailers, and they each stock the same n products. There is no price advertising, and look for a symmetric equilibrium in which each …rm charges the same prices. An individual retailer could make small adjustments to prices and not cause any consumers to search another retailer. Hence at the margin, a competitive …rm has the same pricing incentives as the monopolist did in the earlier part of this paper. In particular there is always an equilibrium in which retailers charge the same prices as a multiproduct monopolit would when facing consumers with search cost s. This obviously has the ‡avour of the original Diamond [8] result.
Conclusion
Multiproduct …rms help resolve the Diamond paradox, but the essential intuition about prices being high persists. Only consumers with high valuations turn up, and the store exploits them by raising prices. Consumers understand this, so in equilibrium price is high, and pro…ts low. A …rm with a broader and frequently-demanded product range has less incentive to hold consumers up, and so charges lower prices. The model therefore provides an intuitive explanation for why retailers have embraced one-stop shopping by expanding into (previously) non-core activities. Further, low-price advertising on a few products acts as a commitment to charging low prices across the whole store. Hence the model also provides a novel explanation for why …rms sometimes use loss-leaders. In addition, prices may move countercyclically and products should be advertised at low prices when their demand is high. 
